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Abstract. The two interviews with Boris Uspenskij on history and the contemporary 
state of linguistics and semiotics discuss the necessity to elaborate a common 
terminology in semiotics, at the same time speaking about perspectives for inter-
disciplinary research, various research models, and the possibilities to produce proof 
in the humanities. Commenting upon some of his own works, in particular on Ego 
loquens (2007), Boris Uspenskij reflects upon the crucial events of his academic life and 
on contacts with his colleagues, emphasizing the importance of friendship with Roman 
Jakobson and Juri Lotman.
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Boris Andreevich Uspenskij (born in 1937), linguist and semiotician from Moscow, 
has been one of the leading figures of the Tartu Summer Schools of Semiotics, and a 
prominent co-author of Juri Lotman.1 Here, we publish the texts of two conversations 
1 Boris Uspenskij’s selection of works has been published in two editions of his Selected Works 
(fi rst edition: Uspenskij 1994a and 1994b, also 1995; the 2nd enlarged edition: 1996a, 1996b, 
1997). His bibliography is presented in F. Uspenskij 2008: 7–65, and in Boyko 2017. About his 
work in general, see Lepik 2013; Guan 2012. Th e issue 11(2/3) of the journal Russian Linguistics 
(1987) was dedicated to the 50th birthday of Boris Uspenskij, and two other festschrift s  – 
Miscellanea slavica (F. Uspenskij 2008) and Forma formans (Bertolissi, Salvatore 2010) were 
published for his 70th birthday. For some earlier published interviews with Boris Uspenskij see 
Podgorzec 1978 [1977]; Salupere 2002; Mazzali-Lurati 2014; Trunin 2016. 
Sign Systems Studies 45(3/4), 2017, 404–448
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with him that took place in 2011 and 2012 and have been merged into a two-part 
interview. The first conversation took place on 25 August, 2011, at the end of the 
Tartu Summer School of Semiotics Semiotic Modelling, held at Palmse, Estonia, on 
22–26 August, 2011, that was the eighth Tartu Summer School of Semiotics according 
to our count2. That particular Summer School started a new period in this series. 
Boris Uspenskij had attended the first six schools and in 2011, in order to renew 
the tradition, we invited several participants of the Summer Schools of the 1960s – 
Boris Uspenskij, Tatyana Tsivyan and Boris Egorov3 – to take part in the event, and 
devoted the whole of the first day to their talks. Our questions to Uspenskij focused 
on his views on semiotics and on his work in this field. For the second part of the 
interview, we visited him at his home in Rome on May 27, 2012. Most of the additional 
questions asked at the time were based on his book Ego Loquens: Language and the 
Communicative Space (2007).4
Part I. On semiotics and linguistics, their history and 
state of the art today
– Boris Andreevich, what would you say about the state of modern semiotics in general?
– Unfortunately, theoretical semiotics is not moving forward. In my opinion, the 
situation is very bad, because there is no progress in semiotics. 
– How long has this been the case, in your opinion?
– I’m afraid that it began already in the 1960s–1970s. From that time on, there has 
been no progress in this field and no evolution. 
– What are the reasons of this situation, to your mind? What are the major problems of 
modern semiotics? 
2 Th e fi rst school took place in 1964 in Kääriku; the second – in 1966 (Kääriku); the third – 
in 1968 (Kääriku); the forth – in 1970 (Tartu); the fi ft h – in 1974 (Tartu); the sixth – in 1986 
(Kääriku); the seventh – in 1995 (Saarjärve); the eighth – in 2011 (Palmse); the ninth – in 2013 
(Kääriku); the tenth – in 2015 (Tartu); the eleventh – in 2017 (Tartu).
3 See Pärn 2012; Kull et al. 2011: 323–326.
4 Th e conversations were held in Russian and recorded; the Russian transcript and its 
translation into English have been approved by Boris Uspenskij. Th e Russian text was translated 
into English by Ekaterina Velmezova; all footnotes have been composed by Kalevi Kull and 
Ekaterina Velmezova. See also our earlier interview with Vyacheslav Ivanov (Velmezova, Kull 
2011). 
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– It seems to me that, in semiotics, basic concepts have not been defined; there is 
no unity of methods. The words ‘semiotics’ and ‘sign’ seem so clear that people can 
use them without any kind of definition — just because everything looks obvious. 
Actually, however, semioticians very often use different metalanguages, which leads 
to the absence of real communication between them. 
– Do you suppose that modern semiotics needs one, more or less generally accepted meta-
language? 
– I think so, yes. At least, a basic language of general notions. 
– Indeed, there is a whole number of schools using various terminologies…
– Exactly. And I don’t know how to go forward in this direction unless there is one 
single meta-language. I am not sure that it is possible to find something in common 
between these schools. From time to time, international congresses on semiotics 
are organized, and this creates an impression that their participants are united by 
common subjects and common research approaches, that they do the same thing, 
but it is not the case. It is a bad sign which is indicative of a decline of this science. I 
would compare this process with that of a language destruction. We know how a natural 
language comes to an end, ceases to exist (for instance, recently, the Ladino language has 
practically disappeared in our plain sight). Usually, people speaking a vanishing language 
know another one, so that the vanishing language is no longer a necessary means of 
communication uniting all its speakers. And in these conditions every speaker provides 
words with his own particular meanings. Therefore the language disappears little by 
little. Something similar is happening today with theoretical semiotics. 
–  Nevertheless, would it still be possible to distinguish some directions of modern 
semiotics which seem promising in your view? 
– First of all, linguistic semiotics: I mean, general linguistics, problems of general 
linguistics which are examined from a semiotic point of view. Then, I would say, the 
semiotics of culture, when cultural texts are approached from a linguistic point of view 
(we are entitled to speak about various “languages” of culture – e. g., language of art, 
language of rituals, symbolic languages, etc.). And also biosemiotics seems promising 
to me, even if I don’t know much about those matters. Finally, semiotics of economics 
seems interesting. 
– Speaking about linguistic semiotics, what problems, in your opinion, could linguistics 
solve by means of semiotics? 
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– Linguists can use the notions of denotatum, form and meaning [denotat, forma, 
znachenie], from the well-known semiotic triangle. In my opinion, this triangle is in 
general one of the most important achievements of semiotics. 
– Is it possible to examine the origin of language as a semiotic problem? 
– Yes, undoubtedly, both in phylogeny and in ontogeny. I mean, in particular, the 
processes of language acquisition by a child. They are obviously based on imitation 
when the interaction of a mother with her child takes place: a child imitates his 
mother, and she, in turn, imitates her child. The child’s speech activity begins with 
inarticulate sounds; it is called childish babble. Meanwhile, mothers quite naturally 
look for meaningful words in this babble. You cannot expect a child to pronounce 
meaningful words, but nevertheless, for his mother, it is quite natural to search for 
meaningful words in this babble and to repeat them and to make her child repeat 
them. It is a semiotic process: signs are created in the process of communication, 
as a product of communication like a communicational derivation; we have here 
something like a communication of self-adjusting organisms. 
When a child is born, his mother begins to talk to him as to an adult. Her behaviour 
contradicts common sense and at the same time it is quite natural. Something very 
strange happens: the mother speaks to her baby, though the latter is evidently not 
capable of understanding what she says to him, because he does not know language 
and, of course, he cannot adequately understand the content of what is said. The 
mother’s behaviour is absolutely irrational and, at the same time, it can be justified 
pragmatically: it is clear that if mothers did not behave in this way, if they did not act 
like this and if they took into account what their children understood and what they 
did not, children would never begin to speak. In this way, a language is taught and 
when a child finally masters it, the child finds himself to be separated from his mother, 
this time semiotically. This way, during the process of semiotic activity, relations 
between the participants in communication are established. 
Of course, communication between a mother and her child takes place not only 
by means of language: facial expression and various sounds (emotional, imitational, 
etc.) play an important role, too. But even signs of this kind can become independent 
communicational signs, that is, conventional, arbitrary, controllable signs. For 
instance, the mother makes a smacking sound with her lips in order for her child to 
take her breast, but in another situation she can do the same thing in order to make 
the child turn his face towards her. In the latter situation, the sign is separated from its 
initial content, being transformed into a manageable instrument. Practically speaking, 
it becomes a linguistic sign. This way, children assimilate linguistic behaviour. 
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– Don’t you think that semiotics could help linguistics to define more clearly, at least, for 
certain models, the limits of language? Because in linguistics the present situation is not 
very rosy either: speaking about ‘language’, people can mean most different phenomena…
 
– Different phenomena, yes, that’s true. But still they are not as different as in the 
case of semiotic notions. By ‘language’ one may mean speech activity or means of 
communication; one may mean language in general or a particular language. However, 
in linguistics all this fits in with an a priori nomenclature. 
– In your book Ego loquens5 you speak, among other things, about deixis and its role in 
language formation. How would you describe the role of zoosemiotics in the context of 
the general problem of language formation or language origins? 
– In my opinion, some parapsychological relations exist between a mother and her baby. 
A baby can understand his mother’s reaction without words, like a dog understands its 
master. At the same time, the human being is a very imitating animal, it is in his nature 
to imitate. Not all animals are like this – though, of course, besides human beings there 
are other animals showing a faculty for imitation. In my opinion, both of these factors 
operate when a language is taught. A child repeats something after his mother and she 
smiles, she approves his behaviour, the child feels this and wants to repeat again and 
again. In her turn, she repeats what he says, correcting his linguistic behaviour, and 
this way they repeat each other. Dogs would behave similarly if they could imitate their 
masters’ speech and if their masters sought to teach a language to them.
– Does it mean that in the case of animals, it is impossible to speak about these two 
factors at once? 
– I don’t know, maybe somewhere these two factors appear together, but it is already 
beyond my competence, I don’t want to take the liberty of making too strong 
generalizations… But I think that these two factors taken together constitute a 
necessary condition to master a language. 
– But is it really necessary to describe the relations between mother and her baby as 
parapsychological? Isn’t it simply educating with praise? 
– At least, a baby perceives his mother’s approval. How it happens – I don’t know. A 
mother can say different words, but her baby – like a dog – perceives one thing: her 
approval. 
5 Uspenskij 2007. 
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– You have already distinguished several directions of semiotics which seem particularly 
promising to you. Would it also be possible to speak about traditions in semiotics, in your 
view? For instance, as to linguistics in its current state, the notion of a tradition is not 
generally accepted, for it presupposes a particular closeness of the linguistic community. 
So what about semiotics? Are there French, Russian, Italian semiotic traditions? 
– I don’t think so. Of course, there is American semiotics, relating to Peirce. Peirce is 
much less popular in other countries than he is in America. But it is hardly possible to 
consider it a national tradition. French semiotics is leftist and very politicized. As to 
Russian semiotics… In the Tartu–Moscow school, we tried not to be connected with 
any kind of ideology. 
– If we continue to discuss linguistic “traditions”, your discovery of the first Russian 
grammar written in Russian was very important for its time – in fact, your work6 opened 
a new era in Russian studies: the study of a whole grammatical tradition which existed 
before Mikhail Lomonosov. How did you find this grammar? 
– By chance. It was also by chance that I became a Slavist. My sphere of interest was 
general linguistics and semiotics, these two disciplines are closely connected with each 
other. While working on semiotics, I became interested in the semiotics of painting 
and, first of all, in the semiotics of icons. The canons of iconic painting are very strict, 
hence icons constitute a much more gratifying material for a semiotic study than 
any other genres of painting. This brought me to Old Believers. I wanted to look at 
icons in their natural environment. Because, you know, icons should be looked at in 
candlelight, they seem so bright precisely because nobody examined them as we do 
today, under a bright electric light. In the churches of Old Believers ancient icons 
appear in their natural conditions. So I went to Old Believers, to their rather secluded 
community in Moscow, and unexpectedly I recognized that they had a particular 
pronunciation when they were reading and singing. At that time, I was not a Slavist, but 
I could still discern a peculiar result of the transformation of the former “yat”7. In the 
beginning I thought that all these people spoke the same dialect, that they all had come 
from the same area. But later I had another idea, namely that it could be a particular 
liturgical pronunciation which is used for reading and singing ecclesiastical texts. It 
turned out that I was right and I began to study this phenomenon. This presupposed, 
on the one hand, expeditions to Old Believers who lived in different localities and 
who had not been communicating with one another for two or three hundred years; 
6 Uspenskij 1975. 
7 Th e name of a particular phoneme represented by the letter “yat” from the old Cyrillic 
alphabet. 
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it was important to prove that they kept the same system of pronunciation which 
had a supradialectal character. On the other hand, I began to study ancient treatises 
in phonetics. I thought that it was necessary to study all published and manuscript 
treatises on language. In the course of this work, I discovered the grammar which you 
have mentioned at the Department of manuscripts of the Library of the Academy of 
Sciences. It was not a grammar of the Church Slavonic language (which interested me 
very much at that time in connection with the pronunciation of Old Believers), but a 
Russian grammar. 
– …So the origins of your work on liturgical pronunciation8 seem clear now too. As to 
the author of the first Russian grammar written in Russian, it was Vasilij Adodurov… 
– Yes, I think I managed to prove it. What is important is that it is the first Russian 
grammar written in the Russian language; in general, Russian grammars had existed 
before, but they had been written in one or another foreign language and were not 
intended for Russian-speaking people.
– Like Ludolf ’s Grammar9, for instance…
– Not only Ludolf ’s Grammar, there were also others10. Although, of course, Ludolf ’s 
Grammar was much more complete than any other grammars. As to the most ancient 
Russian grammar we know today, it was written in English by Mark Ridley (who 
was Boris Godunov’s physician) at the end of the 16th century. Therefore, Russian 
grammars were not so rare: it is clear that foreigners wanted to know Russian, they 
needed it, for example, for trade… Among them, there was Michael  Groening’s 
grammar, which was rather large and written in Swedish, published in Stockholm in 
1750.11 I succeeded in proving that it was a translation of the Russian grammar which 
I had discovered in a manuscript version. 
–  Your discovery has radically changed the chronological presentation of the 
grammaticalization of the Russian language… How would you characterize the semiotic 
character of your own research in the domain of Russian culture, if we can, of course, use 
this expression? Were all your research in this field semiotically oriented? 
8 Uspenskij 1968. 
9 Ludolf 1696. 
10 Cf. Uspenskij 1992. 
11 Groening 1750. 
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– Yes, I think so. For instance, I have written an article about Peter the Great12, in 
which I explain why Peter was reputed to be the Antichrist. It explains, by the way, why 
there were no mass protests against him: a revolution against the Antichrist makes 
no sense; at the same time, there were individual protests, and very audacious ones. I 
tried to show that Peter the Great and his contemporaries spoke using the same words 
with different meanings, as if they spoke different languages. I mean, languages were 
different, while the means of expression were identical. Peter the Great tried to use a 
proper language which he himself was creating. And he wanted Russians to speak this 
newly created language, but the people could not (or would not) communicate in it. 
This was a semiotic problem. 
In general, one of the key directions in my research is the semiotics of history. For 
instance, when we read an ancient manuscript, we want to understand how it was 
interpreted at the epoch of its composition, in particular, how the author himself, as 
well as his contemporaries, saw it. The same thing happens when we study a historical 
text. Historical events can be caused by a whole series of reasons: economical, political, 
etc. But I am interested in the motives which guided the participants of these events, 
and it is a purely semiotic problem, to understand which cultural language they spoke. 
For instance, we know that if there is thunder, it is a physical phenomenon: lightning, 
an electrical discharge… But what is essential is not what we know, but what, for 
instance, people in ancient times thought about this. If they thought that it was the god 
Perun, they acted on their own premises, not on ours. 
– How were you initially drawn to semiotics? Do you remember your first “meeting” with 
semiotics, when was it? 
–  When we were reading Saussure. When I was student, we read Saussure very 
carefully and discussed him, believing that it was the only correct approach to the 
study of language. 
– In this case, why did you define it as semiotics and not as semiology? As to Saussure, 
he was discussing semiology… 
– We defined it as semiotics without implying any opposition between semiotics and 
semiology. 
–  Besides, the word ‘semiotics’ at that time was already relatively widely used, in 
comparison with Saussurean times… 
12 Uspenskij 1976.
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– Yes, indeed. 
– Thus you first discovered Saussure and only afterwards – Peirce? 
– Yes, exactly: first Saussure, then Peirce. 
– What would you say about your own contribution to semiotics? 
– I can hardly be a judge. I used semiotics as an applied discipline, hoping to solve 
some particular problems which seemed topical in one or another domain (for 
instance, studying a literary text, historical events etc.). In other words, I tried to do 
something in the domains of linguistics, study of literature and art, history of culture, 
history as such. Anyhow, it was not a contribution to semiotics; using semiotics, I tried 
to solve some problems which were not semiotic ones. 
– Then, going back to linguistic problems and to linguistics in general, could you please 
tell us what directions of modern linguistics do you consider as most interesting and 
promising? 
– Nowadays the achievements of structural linguistics are sometimes denied. Here is 
a typical example: Viktor Markovich Zhivov13, my former pupil who later became a 
colleague, wrote an article against structuralism, with a typical title: “Parting with 
structuralism” [“Rasstavayas’ so strukturalizmom”]14. But I don’t quite understand why 
we should part with structuralism. The achievements of structuralism, first and foremost 
of the Prague school, remain important. Of course, there are now new directions which 
are first of all concentrated on pragmatics and on the functioning of language, on the 
attitudes of the speaker and the listener, on the problems of deixis. But it is hardly 
reasonable to deny the achievements of the past at every new stage. It is a childish 
reaction: linguistics must develop by accumulation and specification, not by negation. 
– In the lecture that you delivered here at the Summer School you said that, at his time, 
Chomsky had destroyed general linguistics and that it did not exist any longer. But what 
was so special about Chomsky’s theories that could call forth such a situation? 
– First of all, the attitude itself to his theory, its elevation to the level of a dogma. When 
in 1957 Chomsky’s book Syntactic Structures was published, this work seemed very 
13 Viktor Markovich Zhivov (1945–2013), Russian philologist, specialist in history of the 
Russian language.
14 Zhivov, Timberlejk 1997. 
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interesting. But afterwards generative grammar supplanted all other approaches, it 
literally filled linguistics. It seems to me that in America there was approximately the 
same attitude towards scientific leaders as in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, the 
academician Vilyams15 was the main biologist, the academician Pavlov was the main 
physiologist etc. Like Chomsky in America. 
– You knew Sebeok personally, didn’t you? Could you please tell us a little about your 
relations? 
– I cannot say we were friends with Thomas Sebeok, but I knew him well, Sebeok used 
to come round to my house… No, I’m exaggerating: he visited my house only once (in 
the 1970s). On the whole, I don’t consider Sebeok to be a very original scholar. 
– What is your point of view about the significance of his theories for the modern semiotics? 
– I don’t know, really… I think he was nothing more than a manager of science. 
– And what is your attitude towards Umberto Eco’s theories? 
– For me it is difficult to say, because Umberto Eco’s semiotics is in no way connected 
to linguistics. But he is a very nice person. It was long ago, in the 1960s, when he came 
to Moscow in order to meet us all, to get acquainted with us. And afterwards, in Italy, 
of course, I used to meet him too.
– Were you friends with Jakobson16? 
– Yes, if one could call relations between people with such an age difference friendship; 
friendship presupposes an equality (of rights), but of course, our relations were those 
of an elder and of a younger person, although Roman Osipovich did everything he 
could in order to level this difference. We were on first-names terms, which, of course, 
was his initiative, not mine. When my elder son was born, he and Krystyna17 came to 
my place to see him; I was very touched by their attitude. Krystyna spoke Polish to my 
son (he was several months old) because it is natural to speak to a baby in your native 
language. We met many times in Moscow and once in Tartu (he participated in one of 
15 Vasilij Robertovich Vilyams (1863–1939), Russian soil scientist and agronomist.
16 Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896–1982), Russian–American linguist, literary theorist and 
semiotician. 
17 Krystyna Pomorska (1928–1986), specialist in Slavic literature and literary theory, Roman 
Jakobson’s widow.
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the summer schools18) and also in Warsaw, at a Congress of Slavists19. Finally, we were 
together in Georgia: he suggested that we go there together and I accompanied him 
on his tour of the country together with V. V. Ivanov, K. P. Bogatyrev20 (who was later 
killed by security officers), S. I. Bogatyreva21 and T. V. Gamkrelidze22. 
– When did you meet him? 
– If I am not mistaken, Jakobson arrived in Moscow, for the first time after a long 
break, in 1958 – to attend the Moscow Congress of Slavists. But at that time I was 
not in Moscow, I was a student and I had been sent by the University to Western 
Siberia to cultivate virgin lands (Soviet students are known to have been sent there 
often), which is why we didn’t meet at the time. Then he came to Moscow in 1961 or 
in 1962, and afterwards he was there every year, he loved both Moscow and us very 
much – not only because we were Russians but also because we were not Americans… 
He didn’t like America. So he regularly came to Russia till 1968, until the events in 
Czechoslovakia. Naturally, after that he stopped coming. And then he started coming 
back again. 
Once, I managed to organize his lecture at Moscow University. It was an important 
event for the university, the lecture hall was full. I think it was in 1979… But it was also 
an important event for Jakobson himself. Before this lecture he was at my home and I 
saw that he (an experienced lecturer) was very nervous. For him, only one university 
existed: Moscow University. He began to deliver his lecture and I saw how agitated 
he was. At the beginning his voice broke off several times (which was very strange to 
observe in the behaviour of an elderly professor who had been lecturing at various 
universities for many years), and suddenly his voice got stronger, he stood up, it was so 
admirable. But after that, problems began, not for myself, but for my colleagues, who 
were Communist party members (G. A. Haburgaev23, K. V. Gorshkova24) and who had 
helped me organize this lecture. I can probably consider Jakobson my teacher, though 
formally he was not. 
18 In 1966.
19 In 1973. 
20 Konstantin Petrovich Bogatyrev (1925–1976), Russian philologist, translator, specialist in 
German literature.
21 Sofi a Ignat’evna Bogatyreva (b. 1932), historian of literature, K. P. Bogatyrev’s wife. 
22 Tamaz Gamkrelidze (b. 1929), Georgian linguist, orientalist, specialist in Indo-European 
linguistics.
23 Georgij Aleksandrovich Haburgaev (1931–1991), Soviet linguist, specialist in the history of 
Slavic languages. 
24 Klavdia Vasil’evna Gorshkova (1921–2002), Russian linguist, specialist in the Russian 
language.
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– Was he your teacher in the sense that he passed on to you an aspiration for a “holistic 
approach” to the material that you study? 
– In the sense of the general direction of thought, I would say…
– And besides, among your professors was also Louis Hjelmslev25… How useful was this 
for you? Did it influence you when you were working on your PhD thesis (and your book) 
on structural typology26? 
– No, at least not directly. Especially because, as a linguist, Hjelmslev did not impress 
me much. I had read his works, even before my stay in Copenhagen. He was a man 
of the old school: sometimes he would deliver a lecture, sometimes cancel it or leave 
without notice and it was impossible to know whether he would be at the university 
or not. He was a very nice person. And the atmosphere was very agreeable in the 
Copenhagen Linguistic Circle.27 
In my book Ego loquens I reproduce one of my conversations with Hjelmslev, but 
if you want, I can repeat it here. When I arrived in Copenhagen in 1961, I went to the 
Institute of Linguistics and Phonetics, which was an ancient two-storey building. They 
gave me a key and I could go there whenever I wanted, there was a library there, with 
books in open access, and sometimes I was there completely alone. Having found out 
when Hjelmslev was going to be there, I went up to him to introduce myself (officially 
he was my tutor28). I had brought him a book from Moscow with a translation of his 
work. At that time, he didn’t know that they had already published his Prolegomena 
in Moscow, translated by Yurij Konstantinovich Lekomtsev.29 Hjelmslev and I spoke 
English; I didn’t speak Danish at the beginning of my stay. Should I tell you how 
interesting it was for me, to meet Hjelmslev? At the time, he was a legendary figure. 
But I think it was also interesting for him to make my acquaintance because he had 
never seen a Russian student, at least, not after the war. Hjelmslev began to recall 
the Russian scholars whom he had met in his time, and, in particular, he mentioned 
the name of Scherba30, I think that they had met somewhere in the Baltic countries, 
in Lithuania I think, where they had studied Lithuanian. And I decided to tell him 
25 Louis Hjelmslev (1899–1965), Danish linguist, one of the principle founders of the Lin-
guistic Circle of Copenhagen.
26 Uspenskij 1965. 
27 See also Uspenskij 1962.
28 In English, in the original Russian text. 
29 Hjelmslev 1960 [1943 (1953)]. 
30 Lev Vladimirovich Scherba (1880–1944), Russian linguist, lexicographer, specialist in 
phonetics and phonology.
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about the glokaya kuzdra31. At present, experiments like this (phrases created from 
non-existing words) are well known, but at that time it was a fresh and fascinating 
topic. If I am not mistaken, Scherba was the first scholar who made experiments of 
this kind a subject of scholarly research. I was aware that Hjelmslev knew Russian, 
to a certain degree. He told me that his knowledge of Russian was passive, but that 
he could definitely read in Russian. I reproduced Scherba’s phrase and told him how 
Scherba had analysed it from a linguistic point of view. “Yes, and what is the problem?”, 
asked Hjelmslev, manifestly waiting for an interesting continuation. I found his reaction 
strange. “Sorry”, I told him, “Did you understand this phrase?” – “Yes I did”, answered 
Hjelmslev, “Continue please”. I was taken aback. The effect of my story was lost. “Sorry”, 
I said cautiously, “But what did you understand, precisely?” At that moment Hjelmslev 
felt a lack of self-confidence. As I have said, his knowledge of Russian was passive and 
limited. Any native Russian speaker would have immediately understood that the words 
of this phrase were non-existing and artificially created ones, and it would have created 
an obstacle for his comprehension of the whole phrase. Hjelmslev did not know Russian 
well enough to understand that these words did not exist in the Russian language. 
Being a foreigner, he proceeded from the assumption that some Russian words could 
be unknown to him, and this circumstance did not give him any cause to doubt the 
existence of one or another word. “How did you understand this phrase?”, I insisted. 
Slightly confused, Hjelmslev said unwillingly: “I thought that there was a big animal 
which beat another animal and which is now beating its baby animal. Is that not it?” 
In general, this perception corresponds to the associations which this phrase usually 
provokes in Russian-speaking people. Hjelmslev did not know the Russian language well 
enough to understand that there were no words in Russian, from which Scherba’s phrase 
had been composed. But he knew the Russian language well enough to understand the 
general sense of this phrase. In other words, Hjelmslev knew Russian badly, and that 
is why he understood Scherba’s phrase. And, on the whole, he understood it correctly. 
– As to the Copenhagen structuralism, in your opinion, it has never existed, has it? Do 
you mean that Hjelmslev was there alone? But what about Brøndal or Uldall?
– There is an important difference between Hjelmslev and Brøndal32. As to Uldall33, he 
had died before I came to Copenhagen. Eli Fischer-Jørgensen34 was a brilliant figure 
31 A reference to the grammatically correct but meaningless Russian language phrase Glokaya 
kuzdra shteko budlanula bokra i kudryachit bokrenka. 
32 Viggo Brøndal (1887–1942), Danish linguist and language philosopher, one of the founders 
of the Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen.
33 Hans Jørgen Uldall (1907–1957), Danish linguist, worked on glossematics with Louis Hjelmslev. 
34 Eli Fischer-Jørgensen (1911–2010), Danish linguist, specialist in phonetics and phonology.
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there, she was a specialist in phonology. There were also Paul Diderichsen35, Hans 
Christian Sørensen36 and Henning Spang-Hanssen37, all very good linguists. 
– But did they all work within the framework of glossematics? 
– No, that’s the point. But they used to see one another. Of course, their research could 
contain some elements of glossematics, but it was not their corporate language which 
united all linguists who were present there. Linguists from different countries came 
there too, they delivered lectures. I remember particularly well the visit of Eric Pratt 
Hamp38. Hamp wrote an enormous number of works, and almost each of them was 
no more than one page long. If I am not mistaken, he wrote neither books nor large 
articles. But all his works were thorough and interesting. Each of them solved some 
particular problems of this or that Indo-European language. He came to Copenhagen 
from Yugoslavia (now in Kosovo) where he drove around in a jeep, studying the Gheg 
Albanian dialects. His wife Margo was always with him. Hamp was a charming person. 
As to Hjelmslev, he soon died – but before his death he managed to publish a little 
book called Language [Sproget]. Once Hamp arrived in Moscow and made a phone 
call to me; I invited him to my place. We had dinner, got into a conversation and then 
Hamp remembered something and said: “By the way, our American ambassador – 
or American envoy – wants to organize a party, a reception in my honour, at the 
American embassy. Wouldn’t you like to come there, with your wife?” I said: “But 
they won’t let us come!” – “Why not?” – “They won’t let us come, that’s all”. – “But 
would you like to be there?” – “I have nothing against it, but it is unrealistic. When is 
this party taking place?” – “Tomorrow”. I said: “Ah no, that’s absolutely unrealistic”. 
He answered: “Anyway, I shall tell them, at the embassy, that you agreed to come, and 
it will be their business, to organize this meeting”. The next morning, they called me: 
“Mister Uspenskij? We are calling you from the American Embassy”. After this, there 
was a silence in the receiver, all tapping apparatuses were tuning in… “We confirm that 
you are invited to the embassy, this evening”. And indeed, some time later I received 
an invitation in my mail box. So my wife Galya39 and I went there. On that side of the 
Garden Ring – I mean, where Tchaikovsky Street is located, because it was not the 
ambassador but their envoy who had invited us, the American ambassador was not 
there at that time – people didn’t go on that side of the Garden Ring at all at that time, 
35 Paul Diderichsen (1905–1964), Danish linguist, specialist in syntax.
36 Hans Christian Sørensen (1911–?), Danish Slavist. 
37 Henning Spang-Hanssen (1920–2002) Danish engineer and general linguist.
38 Eric P. Hamp (b. 1920), American linguist, specialist in some Indo-European languages 
(Albanian and Celtic languages, among others).
39 Galina Petrovna Korshunova (1937–1978), philologist.
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there were only police officers standing there, one after another. So we went. There 
were police officers standing. They were looking at us – we went on. More police 
officers. We went by. Finally, there was the last cordon. A police officer was there. 
My wife gave him her passport (although he did not ask her for it). The police officer 
examined it carefully from cover to cover, twisted it in his hands and gave it back to my 
wife. I showed him our invitation, but not my passport. He examined the invitation, 
too. He told us: “Please”. We entered and suddenly found ourselves abroad. There was 
a little yard there, obviously they used every centimetre of space. In the yard there was 
a huge dustbin and, straight above it, a bar was suspended, evidently they had very 
little space there. Numbers of the entrance and of the floor had been indicated on our 
invitation. We went upstairs and saw some coats hanging on a coat rack directly at the 
stairwell, therefore we could take off our coats, too. We did it. And suddenly we had a 
wonderful feeling of freedom: We are abroad! We rang the doorbell and this feeling of 
freedom disappeared immediately, because it was a huge Russian woman with a tiny 
headdress and wearing a miniskirt who opened the door; obviously she was a KGB 
sergeant. “Welcome”, she said with a broad smile. We felt ill at ease, at once. Afterwards 
there was a reception à la fourchette. From time to time, two maids appeared (who 
looked the same, hardly pleasant) in order to offer us the next course. One maid held 
a tray in her hands but it seems she was not authorized to speak. As to the other one, 
she could smile and announce a dish or a beverage: “Would you like cognac?” (a 
smile); “Would you like caviar?” (another smile); “Would you like anchovies?” (one 
more smile). “Ah,” my wife said. “Anchovies! I have never eaten anchovies”. The smile 
immediately disappeared from the maid’s face and she said: “No, you have. They are 
on sale in our country”. This way, she took my wife down a peg… But we have already 
digressed from linguistics. 
– Finishing our “chapter” about Hjelmslev: some books on the history of linguistics where 
the Copenhagen school of structuralism is mentioned say that it was the narrowest 
structuralist direction, that it was impossible to limit the object of study any more… 
– Yes, that’s right…
– And how would you define structuralism in its connection with semiotics? Is it possible 
to consider structuralism as a part of semiotics?
– If you like, structuralism is a part of semiotics. But of course, all semiotics cannot be 
reduced to structuralism. 
– You mean, they are related as a set and a subset… 
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– Yes. 
– If we discuss the history of semiotics, it certainly includes the Tartu-Moscow School 
which we have already mentioned today. In your lecture, you said that its participants 
had always aspired for exact methods, for the liberation from any subjectivism… 
– Yes. 
– But what kind of exact methods did you mean? Please give us some examples. 
–  It seemed that we could use some mathematical models such as graphs, for 
instance… But I think that the most important thing – of course, it was a kind of 
a natural-sciences romanticism – was not this, but our awareness of the limits of 
exactitude: we know this, but not that… Let it not be an exact science, but at least we 
understand to what extent it is not exact. 
– However, what exact methods did you use?
– Well, for instance, statistical methods or modelling.
– Let us go back now to another of your previous statements, to your very interesting 
point of view on the evidence and explications in linguistics and in semiotics – you 
touched upon this question in your lecture... And you said that neither in linguistics nor 
in semiotics is it possible to prove anything, but only to explain…
– I think so, yes. Of course, your objection was convincing: yes, in a certain sense, Bopp40 
had managed to prove the affinity of Indo-European languages, but, for instance, can we 
really exclude the influence of language unions? Zaliznyak41 says approximately the same 
thing in his book42. Yes, he seems to have proven that The Tale of Igor’s Campaign is an 
authentic work and not a forgery, but, strictly speaking, why couldn’t we also suppose 
that it was written by a genius who had understood the very essence of Wackernagel’s 
law? Though, in my opinion, it would have hardly been possible. 
– But this is also Zaliznyak’s opinion, his proof is based on this… 
40 Franz Bopp (1791–1867), German linguist, one of the founders of the historical and com-
pa rative Indo-European linguistics. 
41 Andrej Zaliznyak (b. 1935), Russian linguist, specialist in the Russian language and its 
history.
42 Zaliznyak 2004. 
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– Yes, indeed. That is how he proves it. But speaking about proof in general… If I 
understand correctly, when Lavoisier, following Lomonosov, discovered the law 
of conservation of matter, what did he do in order to prove it? He made more and 
more subtle experiments, but in fact we can never know if for an even more subtle 
experiment it would not turn out differently. It is an inductive proof. 
– Therefore in natural sciences the situation is as bad as in human disciplines?
– Yes, it seems so. If absolute proof exists anywhere, they do in mathematics. Though, 
as far as I know, there are some mathematicians who think that even in mathematics 
they do not exist. For instance, if the properties of natural numbers can change after 
one particular element in the natural sequence – we don’t know where – in this case, 
it is impossible to prove anything at all. 
– But is it possible, in this respect, to speak about certain particularities of precisely 
semiotic disciplines?
– Semiotics studies virtual reality. Semiotics does not deal with truth as such. 
– Do you mean that semiotics studies models? 
– Yes, exactly. Or do you think that semiotics deals with truth? 
– Well, we can speak about correspondences, about non-correspondences, or about more 
or less evident correspondences of models to real facts and phenomena.
– It seems to me that we can speak about convincing and non-convincing models. As 
to their correspondence or non-correspondence… 
– Do you think that in natural sciences one can speak about the correspondence and non- 
correspondence of models, while in semiotic sciences, one should speak about convincing 
and non-convincing models?
– It seems to me that in natural sciences one should also speak about the convincing 
and non-convincing character of models. But here I am afraid that it is not already in 
my field any more…
– Then maybe there exists nothing but models in all sciences in general, and researchers 
have nothing more at all? 
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– Yes, maybe…
– And therefore we can only discuss whether these models are adequate or not… But does 
anything exist beyond the models?
– You know, as Mandel’shtam said, “He shapes experience from babble / And drinks 
babble from experience…” [Оn opyt iz lepeta lepit / I lepet iz opyta p’et…] 
– However, it still seems that, in this respect, there is a difference between semiotics and 
natural sciences. 
– What difference do you mean?
– The difference is that semiotics studies various forms of knowledge. It is knowledge 
about knowledge. That is why the object of semiotics is different from the object of 
natural sciences.
– Yes, I agree. But do you mean that there are no experiments in semiotics? 
– Why not? Only the fact is that in semiotics it is impossible to repeat the conditions of any 
experiment, while in natural sciences one can repeat the same experiment several times. 
– What kind of experiments do semioticians make?
– Аnd what about linguists? 
– For instance, experiments are possible in field linguistics. 
– In the domain of applied linguistics, of course… As to semioticians, they study sign 
systems like linguists do, only these are particular sign systems. But if experiments are 
possible in linguistics, they are of course also possible in semiotics. 
– No, but … What kind of experiments can we make in linguistics? For instance, I ask 
a person who speaks a certain first language if it is possible to say something in one 
particular way, and not differently…
– Or, for instance, in psycholinguistics or in neurolinguistics, studying aphasia is very 
much based on experiments…
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– Yes, of course, but what has all this got in common with semiotics? 
– For example, imagine somebody speaking one language, but changing the pronunciation, 
I mean, speaking as people usually do not speak… But these are experiments in order 
to find out how it influences, for instance, the understanding of what is said. That is in 
linguistics. In semiotics, for instance, they repaint a house, in a way that people usually 
don’t do. And then they observe what happens. The situation changes… Why can’t we 
call this an experiment?
– We can, of course… And yet I would say that experiments are not the main method 
used in linguistics nor is it in semiotics.
– That is already quite another story… If we go back now, once again, to the Tartu–
Moscow School, during the last ten years, at least, some Moscow semioticians, the 
majority of whom have had a linguistic education, show interest in the study of proper 
nouns. They organize conferences and publish books of collected articles on this topic43… 
What is your attitude towards this kind of research? 
– In my opinion, it is very interesting!
– What would you say about the methodology of some of them? Some Moscow 
semioticians are often blamed for using methods that are not scientific, that all this is 
no more than a kind of insight, some flashes of inspiration, like Saussure (who was keen 
on anagrams) felt in his time that somewhere in particular texts proper nouns were 
hidden or “encoded”… Of course, now we are not speaking about the historical research 
of Moscow semioticians, but precisely about their analysis of “hidden (proper) nouns” in 
literary texts: someone can see them, while others cannot… 
– Yes, I think that from a methodological point of view the research of anagrams is 
doubtful indeed… 
– In your opinion, by what conception or by what model of the linguistic sign are the Moscow 
linguists-semioticians guided in their research? Would it be possible to say that the authors 
of those works don’t share the Saussurean principle regarding the arbitrariness of connection 
between the signifier and signified in linguistic signs? Because, in fact, if a particular meaning 
is looked for in a form, this connection seems no longer arbitrary indeed…
43 Cf., for example, Nikolaeva 2001, 2007 and 2010; Uspenskij 2003 etc.
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– No; however, in my opinion, linguistic signs are arbitrary.
– Do you mean, sign-symbols? 
– Sign-symbols, yes. And later on, on their basis, secondary connections can appear, 
but it does not mean that linguistic signs are not arbitrary. As to the diverse research 
made on anagrams, I also find it rather questionable, but, on the other hand, sometimes 
there are some evident cases. Such cases can also be found in music; for instance, when 
Bach encoded his own name in notes. This reminds us of similar evident cases with 
verbal texts. 
– Yes, it does… On the other hand, Moscow semioticians are sometimes criticized for 
their study of ‘world models’: such as ‘the Slavic world model’, ‘Balkanic world model’44… 
Do you consider ‘the world model’ to be a reliable linguistic concept? 
– Yes, the ‘world model’ seems to be a concept with which it is possible to operate. But 
“Balkanic” or “Slavic” models are already more doubtful. 
– But in this case, how would you define a ‘world model’, if it is not by way of language?
– By way of language. But by way of one concrete language and not of Slavic languages 
in general. 
 
– Therefore, all in all, you share W. von Humboldt’s point of view on the existence of the 
“inner form of language” which somehow influences our perception of the world? Or, for 
instance, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis? 
– Yes, I do. 
– Let us speak now about other possible precursors of the Tartu–Moscow School of 
Semiotics. In your work “Myth – name – culture” [“Mif – imya – kul’tura”]45 which you 
wrote together with Juri Mihajlovich Lotman, you discuss the so-called mythological 
thought as a very particular kind of thinking. When stating this, were you guided by some 
works which already existed at that time and whose authors expressed similar opinions? 
In particular, to what extent does your point of view correlate with Lévy-Bruhl’s theories 
about “primitive thought”46? 
44 Cf., for instance, Tsiv’yan 1990 and 1999, etc.
45 Lotman, Uspenskij 1973. 
46 Lévy-Bruhl 1910, 1922. 
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– I think it does; that is, maybe, it does not correlate directly, but, anyhow, I have 
always appreciated his theories. 
– It seems that some parallels can be found indeed. For instance, you say that mythological 
thought is not at all primitive in the sense of its simplicity: it is oriented towards the 
solving of rather complex problems. A similar opinion is also present in Lévy-Bruhl’s 
works: the fact is that the so-called “primitive thought” does not disappear, but remains 
at all “stages” of the development of humanity… 
– Of course, I had read Lévy-Bruhl and I think so had Juri Mihajlovich, and even if we 
could have said this ourselves, we had predecessors, of course. 
– What do you appreciate the most in Lotman? What was his most important, most 
remarkable quality, in your opinion? 
– Lotman’s most important quality was, of course, his human charisma. 
– Yes indeed. And also, maybe, the fact that, in his case, science was inseparable from 
morality… 
– Yes, exactly. 
– And if we take the Tartu–Moscow School in general, is it possible to speak about its 
influence on modern semiotics? Or is it nothing more than history of science, today? 
– I don’t know what modern semiotics is, I think it does not exist. That is why it is 
difficult to speak about any influence. 
– Do you mean that everything happening today is a repetition of what has already taken 
place in the past?
– No, in my opinion, in semiotics as such – in theoretical semiotics – the situation now 
is catastrophic; I already said it at the beginning of our conversation.
– And, in your opinion, the way out of this difficult situation is possible only in unity, in 
finding a common language between different schools… 
– I think that another way out can also be in using semiotics as an applied discipline, 
when primary importance is assigned to concrete problems which can be solved with 
semiotic methods. Then semiotics can be justified. 
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– Indeed, it seems that in many lectures presented at this School no problems were raised 
at all. 
– Yes, you are right. 
– Still in linguistics, for instance, we have got accustomed to the fact that first we raise a 
problem and then we solve it. And here sometimes it was not clear where some lectures 
started and where they ended… There was also a lack of concrete examples in some 
lectures. 
– But on the other hand, there were some quotations… 
– It appears that, in order to avoid problems, semioticians must learn… how to raise 
problems!
– Yes, I think so. 
– Thank you!
– Thank you. 
Part II. Additional questions on semiotics, 
as based on the book Ego loquens47
For this interview, we had prepared 13 questions on which this conversation is based. 
1.
– Boris Andreevich, how would you define semiotics, where are the limits of semiotics, 
in your opinion? 
– I could define semiotics as a science studying signs, but this does not say much. The 
sign is something which has a form [vyrazhenie] and a meaning [soderzhanie] – but 
once again, to say so is to say very little. 
47 Uspenskij, B. А. 2007. Ego loquens: Yazyk i kommunikatsionnoe prostranstvo. [Ego loquens: 
Language and the communicative space.] Moskva: Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj gumanitarnyj 
universitet. Numbers of pages in brackets in the text below are from this edition. 
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– Тherefore, your definition of the sign is a Saussurean one? 
– Yes, it is. More precisely, I would define semiotics as general linguistics. I mean, 
there is linguistics and there is general linguistics, and besides, there is also general 
general linguistics, I mean, the most general linguistics [рredel’no obschaya lingvistika], 
linguistics in the most general sense [lingvistika v predel’no obschem smysle]. 
– Do you mean, “meta-general linguistics”? 
– Yes, I do. 
– In this case, linguistics constitutes a part of semiotics, doesn’t it? 
– Yes, linguistics is a part of semiotics. 
– But do you mean here all linguistics, in general? And what about, for instance, the 
cases when it is a question of purely phonetic research, for example studies on the pitch 
of sounds or on fundamental frequency?
– If all these studies have something to do with meaning, and usually they do, then this 
is, of course, semiotics. And what has nothing to do with meaning is not semiotics. 
– Аnd if we take, for instance, frequency analysis in the study of texts? Let us say, studies 
of frequency of the use of a particular word in a text… 
– I think that all this has to do with meaning, indirectly. For example, how do you 
distinguish the sound of language from the sound of a cough? Language sounds are 
meaningful, whereas the sounds of a cough are not. There are some sounds which we 
utter involuntarily, which are not meaningful and which we ignore when we speak. 
– However there are cases when it is difficult to distinguish, for instance, an interjection 
as an element of language from an involuntarily uttered sound. 
– Yes, sometimes it is. But some things will be meaningful and some things will not. Of 
course, in principle, even the sounds of cough can be meaningful. When I demonstrate 
something with my cough…
– For instance, when with coughing sounds you inform somebody about your presence, 
“Ahem. Ahem.”
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– Yes. And then this is semiotics, of course, but not of the linguistic kind. And there are 
also some sounds which have nothing to do with meaning, and which we disregard; 
for instance, when we hear them recorded or when we listen to our interlocutor. It is 
the same with breathing, for instance. 
– If we go back to interjections, when, in your opinion, is ‘ah’ an interjection and when is 
it an involuntary sound? What transforms ‘ah’ into a language element? 
– ‘Аh’ is an interjection because it is composed of phonemes, /а/ and /h/ (by the way, 
this interjection is a Gallicism in the Russian language, it is absent from dialects). And 
when we deal with an involuntary sound, we can only put it down very approximately, 
when, for instance, we reproduce the sound of a rooster as ‘cock-a-doodle-do’. 
– Нowever, phoneme analysis will also depend on the researcher’s point of view. If he 
wants to find phonemes somewhere, he will find them... Maybe it is precisely the point 
of view of the speaker which transforms an involuntary sound into an interjection? The 
speaker must have an intention…
– Yes, I think you are right. 
 
– Аnd where are the limits of semiotics, from your point of view? 
–  If signs are involved, then it is semiotics. And when signs are absent, it is not 
semiotics. But at the same time I don’t understand well if, for instance, reflexes are 
signs or not. 
– There exists a point of view that when a reflex has already been created and when it 
has become quite automatic, it serves as a code, but there is no semiosis in this, like in 
mechanisms… That is, originally it was a sign, but later, when it became automatic, it 
stopped being a sign and turned simply into a working code. 
– I see. But this way you have answered the question you asked me yourself. Where 
there are signs, there is semiotics. And where there are no signs, there is no semiotics. 
– But it is also possible to think that semiotics embraces phenomena which suppose 
automatism; that is, they are no signs as such, but they are, at the same time, products 
of semiosis. 
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– I think that all these are scholastic questions. If it is possible to apply what you are 
talking about to a particular description, it should be done. If it is not possible, there 
is no need to apply it. 
– How would you define the ‘sign’? And where are the limits of the property of being signs 
[znakovost’]? 
– As I have already said, the sign is a phenomenon which has a form and a meaning. 
– Would you consider living organisms, or their parts, as signs? 
– But why is a living organism a sign? Of course, the late Sebeok said that everything 
was a sign, but this somewhat deprived his theory of sense. 
– Do you consider that semiotics does not extend, for instance, to animate nature or to 
ecological systems? 
– No, I don’t think it does. 
– Тherefore, for you, in general, semiotics is limited by culture, isn’t it? 
– Yes, I think it is. 
– But in this case, what is your attitude towards biosemiotics? 
– Zoosemiotics is certainly a part of semiotics, one where animal communication is 
studied, among other things. Or is zoosemiotics not biosemiotics? 
– No, of course, zoosemiotics is a part of biosemiotics. But it turns out that, speaking 
about zoosemiotics, you still distinguish signs, even if it is not a sphere of culture, is it? 
– It is, first of all, a sphere of communication. But why wouldn’t it be culture? Of 
course, it is not human culture. But why should we consider that people have a culture, 
but not ants? 
– Do you think that where communication exists, there is culture too? 
– Yes, of course. 
– This means, for you, semiotics is directly connected with communication, isn’t it?
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– Yes, it is. 
– But in this case, however, animate nature will bear a direct relation tо the notion 
of semiotics, because everything communicates in living nature, for instance, in an 
ecological system… 
– Maybe, I simply don’t know it. But what do you mean by “everything communicates”? 
– Imagine animals, or even simple unicellular organisms, which move and which have 
the organs of movement…
– Do they have any choice in their behaviour?
– They have a choice in the sense that they have some kind of perception, which allows 
them to move in different directions – to the left or to the right…
– I simply haven’t studied that and I don’t know that. What you say seems to be 
anthropomorphism, that is, an attribution of our ideas about human communication 
to these simple unicellular organisms. If it is so, then of course, it is semiotics. 
– It would be better to do without any anthropomorphism, here… 
– But how is this possible, since we are humans? Can we study the communication of 
animals without anthropomorphism? I am not sure of it, especially as because, in my 
opinion, there has not been much progress in the study of animal communication. Of 
course, the language of bees, described by Karl von Frisch, does not resemble human 
communication. 
– No, of course not. 
– And I don’t know if there is any choice in their communication, any free will. I mean, 
if sentences can be constructed or not, I simply don’t know that. In your opinion, what 
is the fundamental difference between human communication and communication 
like the language of bees? 
– In the language of bees there are no symbols. 
– Do you mean, symbols according to Charles Peirce?
–  Yes. There are icons and indices, but there aren’t any symbols, that is, no pure 
conventionality. This seems to be the main difference.
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– Then, of course, all this is directly linked to semiotics. Semiotics is determined by 
communication, and when we speak about culture, the latter is also a derivative from 
communication. But of course, communication cannot be reduced only to human 
communication. 
– Therefore, do you consider that the limits of the property of being signs [znakovost’] 
are also determined by communication?
– Yes. But communication can also imply the attitude of the one who sends a message 
to the one who perceives it, and sometimes it is possible that only the latter is present, 
while the sender of the message is absent. 
– Аnd autocommunication also exists… Of course, it is a particular kind of communication, 
too… But let us move on to the next questions. How would you define the ‘signal’? Is 
the ‘signal’ the same thing, for you, as the ‘performative sign’ [performativnyj znak] (cf. 
pp. 103, 104–105, 145)? How would you define the ‘symptom’ (cf. p. 154–155)? 
– In my book, I give the following definition of the signal (p. 103): “In contrast to 
linguistic signs, signals are not used for information exchange and therefore they 
are not intended for dialogue”. I mean, there is no exchange of roles here. As to 
performative signs, they are not the same as signals. Indeed, performative signs can 
be used for dialogical communication. But when at traffic lights we see a red or a green 
light, nobody is expecting an answer in the same language from us. You simply see a 
green light and you drive. This way, you reply to this sign. But it is not a dialogue in 
the sense that you don’t answer in the same language. As to the symptoms, I write the 
following (р. 154–155): “The signal of an animal is an expression of an affective state 
and of involving of other animals into it. It would be more precise in this case to speak 
about symptoms which are perceived as signals, rather than about signals”. 
– And how would you describe the structure of the linguistic sign and its meaning – for 
instance, that of a common noun – in the Indo-European languages (cf. p. 11)? Do you 
consider that non-individual connotations are a part of the structure of the meaning? 
–  Yes. I would say that the structure of meaning [znachenie] includes meaning 
[znachenie], denotatum and non-individual connotations. 
– Тherefore, here you pass from the Saussurean binary model of the sign to a ternary 
model, don’t you?
– Yes, it seems so; I am sinning, yes…
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2.
–  What are the bases and origins of your classification which divides signs into 
informative, performative and formative ones [informativnye, performativnye, 
formativnye] (pp. 50–53)? There are no references in your book… 
– I have the impression that it was me who invented it, that is why there are no 
references. 
– You know, we have found exactly the same classifications which already existed before, 
with the same terms: forma – informa – performa… For instance, in the book of Jan 
L. G. Dietz, Enterprise Ontology, published in 2006. Аs to your book, it was published 
approximately at the same time, in 2007…
– I haven’t read this book by Dietz. As to my own book, I had written it earlier, of 
course. And I arrived at this classification independently, in the sense that I know 
neither Dietz’s book nor its author. But it is possible that certain things were simply 
in the air… Besides, the notion of ‘performativity’ itself already existed before me – 
likewise the words ‘information’ and ‘form’. But I use these words in a slightly different 
way. For instance, regarding ‘performativity’, I understand the term in a broader sense 
than it is usually done. 
– Isn’t it possible, in this case, to consider the speech act theory which Searle and Austin 
have written about as one of the sources of your classification?
– You know, I haven’t read them. I tried to do that, Searle first of all, but it did not seem 
so interesting to me. I can’t say anything bad about him, he simply thinks differently 
somehow, not quite in a linguistic way, I would say. I only know the speech act theory 
by hearsay, and for me that was enough. 
– Was Habermas among your sources? In his theories it is possible to find something 
similar, too…
– No. You know, sometimes I have the impression that, like Monsieur Jourdain, I speak 
in prose. Probably such things were simply in the air. 
– You write in your book, for instance, that in mythological thought the pronoun ‘I’ will 
function as a proper noun (p. 61). It means that, in this case, ‘I’ and proper nouns belong 
to the same category of signs. However in your classification, they are put in different 
categories: proper nouns are a part of performative signs, while pronouns are formative 
432 Ekaterina Velmezova, Kalevi Kull
signs. Therefore it turns out that your classification is not universal, but that it reflects a 
particular type of thought, a modern one. In this case, what classification of signs would 
you propose for a “mythological” type of thought? Or for other types of thought, which, 
in your opinion, it is possible to distinguish (if this is the case, of course)?
– The phenomenon of proper nouns seems to be basic for the definition of mythological 
consciousness. This does not mean, of course, that there are no pronouns in this type 
of linguistic behaviour. However, we can imagine a case when the pronoun ‘I’ turns out 
to be a proper noun – and therefore, it becomes the same category as proper nouns. 
An example of mythological consciousness is the thought of a child. Imagine that you 
are speaking to a child and, of course, you use the pronoun ‘I’ as a pronoun. At the 
same time, the child uses this pronoun as a proper noun and therefore he can say: 
“Don’t you dare call yourself ‘I’, because it’s me who is ‘I’”! 
– But how would you define the type of sign in this usage of ‘I’ by a child? Will this sign 
be performative or formative? If for a child it is a proper noun, it means that it is a 
performative sign. And, therefore this classification is not universal, it is not the same for 
all languages: in the case of the language of a child it will be different in the sense that the 
division of signs into various categories will not be the same as for the language of adults, 
where the pronoun ‘I’ will be in the group of formative signs. 
– Yes, but at the same time, if we speak about language practice rather than about 
consciousness, the classification will remain universal, because there is a way in which 
we speak with children. In this classification, there exist various cells, but they can be 
filled differently; you are right. 
– Does it make sense to distinguish other types of thought in addition to mythological 
thought? 
– I don’t know… Mythological consciousness is so important because it is present in 
the ontogeny, we all live through it… And, in a certain sense, we keep it forever. 
3.
– In your book, you say that signals (like other signs which have no meaning) refer to 
concrete and isolated fragments of reality which exist irrespectively of other phenomena 
(pp. 104–105). However, by definition, any sign can exist only in a system. Would it be 
right, in this case, to speak about fragments of reality which are “isolated”, rather than 
“connected with each other”?
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– Of course, by definition, any sign can exist only in a system. As to the signals – let 
us take, once again, the example of traffic lights. Here we have three possibilities: 
green, yellow and red lights. No, I don’t maintain that the whole reality is reduced to 
these three possibilities (it is our language which embraces everything), but only one 
concrete situation. When I speak about a conсrete and isolated fragment of reality, 
I mean a particular system of signals. However, within the framework of a concrete 
situation, of course, signals are not separated from one another, but are interconnected.
4. 
– You also write about closeness [zamknutost’] when discussing the meanings of (in 
particular) linguistic signs (pp. 9, 10, etc.). But what do you mean by closeness, in this 
case? – because you know that new notions constantly appear in language; besides, as 
you say, “vocabulary is principally open, in language” (p. 220). 
– I mean that we think, and that our thought is limited by the language which we use. 
We cannot overstep its limits – like in Gödel’s theorem we cannot overstep the limits 
of a system of description. In language, all the words are interconnected, and the whole 
universe is covered by this totality of meanings. Of course, there exist other languages. 
We can overstep the limits of one particular language if we know another one – in 
this case our experience simply becomes richer. But, anyhow, we shall be limited by 
our language (or languages), in which we think and in which we perceive our world. 
Speaking about closeness, I mean that we cannot overstep the limits of understanding 
which is imposed to us by our language, in the broadest sense. 
– In this case, speaking about closeness, do you understand the language as a system 
which must be closed, by definition?
– Yes. It is closed, but at the same time, it is not fixed. That is, it can grow and change, 
in general. 
– You mean, in diachrony. And on a synchronic level, according to you this system is 
closed, isn’t it? 
– Yes, if we understand synchrony as static. 
– As regards language and understanding, may we consider understanding to be primary, 
while language is secondary? That is, we understand something before we formulate it 
by means of language. Therefore, at first, there is an unconscious understanding, when 
other sign systems operate.
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– I don’t think so. But what kind of understanding do you have in mind? 
– Мaybe, by intuition? 
– But there is also comprehension, and in this case language is used, isn’t it? 
– Yes, when cognition begins to function, in the sense of reflection, of course, then 
language starts working. 
– Yes. Of course, it is possible that there is something else, apart from that. But, in 
my opinion, it is not connected with comprehension. Maybe, as Kant maintained, we 
understand intuitively what is good and what is bad. It is a question of belief. 
– Аnd if one speaks about unconscious comprehension? 
– Do you mean what Jung wrote about? 
– Well, it is not necessary to reason precisely in his terms – but it seems that we should 
not exclude the existence of this domain.  
– But we don’t know anything about it. 
– Why not? It is possible to try to describe this field – as it is possible to try to describe the 
knowledge and cognition of animals. 
– You mean, for instance, reflexes? When, let us say, we hear some loud noise and we 
are frightened before understanding what has happened? 
– Yes, for instance. Or when we look at a picture and recognize something, for example, 
some figures. This recognition, of course, is part of some primary sign processes. They 
take place much earlier than our cognition begins to function. 
– Imagine that a man is drawn in a picture. Do you think that at first we understand 
that it is a man, then we become aware of this fact, and then language begins to 
function? Don’t you think that even during a primary recognition of this man on the 
picture, we still pronounce, mentally, the word “man”, for instance, in a stenographic 
way?
– Аnd if we take some even simpler distinctions than ‘a man – non-man’, for instance, 
or our recognition of different colours? We distinguish various colours – in particular, 
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our memory (which functions partly on an unconscious level) helps us, – even before we 
call them by their names. And of course, it is already a particular sign system, because 
arbitrariness is present. 
– But where is the boundary between the conscious and the unconscious? Do you 
remember the story of a famous lecture at the Moscow Mathematical Society, which 
took place (or rather which didn’t take place) in the early 20th century? At that time, 
the chairman of the Moscow Mathematical Society was Nikolaj Vasil’evich Bugaev48, 
Andrej Belyj’s father. A lecturer had to give a talk on the following subject: “Do animals 
have consciousness?”, and the chairman said: “Before I call upon the lecturer to speak, 
I would like to ask if somebody here knows what consciousness is. You, for instance, 
do you know?” – “No, I don’t”. – “What about you?” – “No, I don’t know that”. – “And 
you?” – “No”. – “I adjourn this meeting”. 
5. 
– In your book, the word smysl ‘sense’ is used in different meanings: it is, evidently, a 
synonym for оsmyslennost’ ‘meaningfulness’ (p. 114, etc.), and also an analogue of the 
word ‘meaning’, but already at the level of text (p. 99). How would you define sense on 
the whole, if it is possible to define it terminologically at all? Should we completely give 
up the term ‘sense’ on the level of particular words – for instance, in the opposition of 
the words’ senses and meanings?
– In linguistics, I understand sense basically as a text phenomenon. But of course, it can 
also be a question of particular words, of words in contexts. Meaning is a phenomenon 
of language, like a word. But words in a text have – or can have – a sense. 
6.
– In your book you introduce several criteria allowing us to maintain that texts are 
meaningful, that they have a sense. They are: 
(а)  a text has a sense “if all its significant components (words) can be considered as 
correlating with a certain situation. In other words, a text has sense if there is at least 
one context which is common for its significant components [But what do you mean 
by “significant components”? Is it the same thing as “categorematic words”? – 
Е. V., K. K.] If we cannot imagine such situation, the text, on the contrary, appears as 
senseless, we are not capabale of understanding it” (p. 114, cf. also p. 124);
48 Nikolaj Vasil’evich Bugaev (1837–1903), Russian mathematician.
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(b)  a text (a sentence) becomes meaningful if “we mean that its content, in principle, can 
be a subject of discussion and that theoretically it can be estimated as true or false: 
we admit that a potential addressee, in certain conditions, can agree with its content 
or not” (p. 166); 
(c)  a text (a sentence) is meaningful if it is possible to translate it into other languages 
(p. 171);
(d)  the grammatical correctness of a text (of a sentence) is a criterion allowing to affirm 
that it is meaningful (pp. 220–221);
(e)  a text becomes meaningful thanks to the presumption that it is meaningful (pp. 170, 
189, etc.); 
(f)  a text is considered as meaningful if we admit that it is possible to “imagine a 
situation in which we could produce the same – or a similar, from our point of 
view – text” (p. 223)…
Among all these criteria, which one do you consider as the most important one?
– I think that the basic criterion is the connection with a particular situation: a text 
is meaningful if all its significant components can be considered as correlating with 
a certain situation, if there exists at least one context which is common for all its 
significant components (yes, ‘significant component’ is the same thing as ‘categorematic 
word’). But at the same time, of course, it is impossible to cancel all other criteria. And 
it depends a lot on pragmatic tasks, to determine which criterion will be the basic one. 
For instance, if you are a translator, then, for you, it is the possibility to translate a text 
which becomes the criterion that the text is meaningful. If you are a native speaker of a 
language and if I want to understand you, then for me, once again, the most important 
will be the first criterion, the connection with a particular situation. 
– Аs to the two last criteria, don’t you think that they allow us to consider any text as 
meaningful, in general? In other words, joining the opinion of Putnam which you are 
quoting, “However wrong a sentence is, it is absolutely unreasonable to maintain that 
under no circumstances it can be uttered by a speaker and understood by a listener” 
(p. 132) (this concerns not only grammatically erroneous sentences, but also sentences 
constructed from non-existing words)? 
– According to my brother49, for instance, there are no senseless texts at all. And he 
is almost right… But not quite, I would say. Of course, it is very difficult to give an 
example of a senseless text. But, I think, it is still possible to imagine texts, which it is 
impossible to make any sense of. For instance, we can rearrange the words or change 
the grammar… Here, for instance, is a senseless text: ‘Adresat izvestnyh pri’. 
49 Vladimir Uspenskij (b. 1930), Russian mathematician and linguist.
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– But, according to your first criterion, this text makes sense, because it is possible to 
imagine a situation which makes it meaningful. Imagine that you say to a child: “Repeat, 
please: ‘Adresat izvestnyh pri’”. And the child says this, “Adresat izvestnyh pri”.
– But when we quote, of course, any text can become meaningful. 
– Therefore it means that there is a certain level at which any text is always meaningful. 
– Yes, Oxfordian theoreticians studied and played this kind of logic games. 
– Аt the same time, one of your criteria evidently refers to the property of being signs 
[znakovost’]: “It is the presumption that a text is meaningful which makes it sensible”. 
That is, “meaningful” means everything which is considered as а sign or as a text. 
– Yes, but here we already overstep the limits of the language, and I am interested first 
of all in language, in what is sensible in language. 
7.
– In connection with the question of meaningful texts, we have already touched upon 
the problem of translation. As you say, “translation can be considered as a particular 
kind of communication. In the situation of translation the sender creates a text, while 
the addressee creates an adequate (from his point of view [our emphasis  – Е. V., 
K. K.]) text in another language. These texts are supposed to have one sense (it is an 
initial premise which, generally speaking, cannot be realized in practice)” (pp. 99–
100). But if, as you defined it earlier (pp. 98–99), the denotatum of the text is always 
a particular and unique situation which everybody perceives differently, wouldn’t it 
be more correct to speak about an “initial premise which, generally speaking, is never 
realized in practice”? In other words, wouldn’t it be more correct, in this situation, to 
speak about the impossibility of a (completely adequate) translation? 
– What is essential is that, while translating, we proceed from the possibility of a 
completely adequate translation. Otherwise, we are not translating. 
– But what do you mean by adequate translation, in this case? 
– I mean when a translated text is basically the same as the original one, when the most 
important things are translated. Even if, strictly speaking, no adequacy is possible 
here, because if I translate, for instance, from Russian into English, then, afterwards, 
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any person who will translate my English text back into Russian will not obtain the 
original text. That is why, anyhow, the adequacy will be only approximate. But when 
we translate, we act on the premise that a compromise is possible. That is, we proceed 
from the assumption that a back translation of our text will coincide with the original 
text. Here I can draw the following parallel: when I say something to you, I can, of 
course, consider that we all think differently anyway and, therefore, you will not 
understand me. But then it is time to become silent, as Wittgenstein advised (already 
after he had written his vast treatise…). And still, probably, if we speak to each other, 
we don’t act on this premise, but we suppose that our interlocutor will understand 
the most important things. Once again, it looks like we are making a compromise. 
But the notion of compromise itself is not exact, the more so because, in the case of 
translation, the person making the evaluation is a translator himself. But such is the 
world in which we live: it is impossible to translate anything totally accurately, and, 
maybe, it is even impossible to express oneself totally accurately. 
 
– The question will just be what constitutes this most important thing which must be 
preserved in translation. Imagine, for instance, an advertisement of a banking product 
connected with Finland, which in Russian sounds like this: “Genuine Finnish quality” 
[Nastoyaschee finskoe kachestvo]. In Russia, this advertisement would work well. Now, 
if you tried to distribute the same product in Switzerland translating this advertisement 
from Russian into, let us say, French, word for word, the advertisement would not work 
at all, because of the different connotations of the word ‘Finnish’, in Russian and in 
French.
– Of course, this is an example of a non-adequate translation. A good translator would 
translate it, for instance, as “Genuine Swiss quality”, if the advertisement is intended 
for Switzerland. 
– That is why, maybe, the question about what is the most important thing which should 
be retained by all means in translating remains open – along with the question about 
the adequacy of translation. All this is so interesting because Lotman, for instance, – 
especially in his last works – wrote about the importance of the notion of untranslatability 
[neperevodimost’]. According to him, untranslatability is present in any communication, 
in any translation. Where there is something meaningful, there is untranslatability 
present, partially. But speaking about adequate translation, you obviously mean another 
thing, something else. 
– Yes, indeed. 
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8.
– In your interview in Palmse you said that you had first discovered Saussure and 
only afterwards Peirce. Whose position – that of Saussure or of Peirce – seems to you 
more congenial, now? Reading your book can leave the impression that, regarding some 
questions, you are much closer to Peirce or, at least, that you are not so close to Saussure – 
for instance, when you present the structure of a sign as a binary or a ternary one (p. 53); 
when you understand text as a complex sign (pp. 97–98); when you touch upon the 
subject of creating signs in communication, rather than using signs which already exist 
(p. 9), etc. At the same time, when you gave a definition of the sign earlier, you apparently 
did it “à la Sausssure”. So on what conception of the sign are your works based on? 
– The fact is that when I make a theoretical step forward, I don’t reflect every time 
upon whether it will be according to Saussure or according to Peirce. Otherwise it 
would be impossible to work. It is exactly as though you asked me: “Do you eat more 
pepper or mustard?” I eat both pepper and mustard, I eat both meat and fish. And 
I digest all this, in one way or another… Even if, subjectively, I appreciate Saussure 
more – first of all, because he is a linguist and I understand what he says. As to Peirce, 
as a rule, I simply don’t understand him. But he is not responsible for this, because 
during his life he didn’t publish much (like Saussure, actually), with the exception of 
this simple classification which had existed already long before, already Augustine was 
familiar with it: I mean the division of signs into icons, indices and symbols. As to all 
the rest in Peircean works, I don’t understand it, and the most important thing is that 
I don’t understand in which context all this can be useful. 
– They say, for instance, that in Peirce’s works, the sign is presented in its development, 
while in the case of Saussure, this temporal dimension is absent. 
– But how is it possible to use it in concrete researches – if, of course, we don’t 
study Peirce in detail? As we have already seen, the sentence ‘Аdresat izvestnyh pri’ 
makes sense, it becomes meaningful when quoted. In this case, Peirce also becomes 
meaningful if somebody studies his theories. But will he be meaningful beyond these 
particular studies? 
– Here is an example of how Peircean semiotics can be “meaningful”, or useful: it is 
possible, for instance, to differentiate between plants, animals and humans precisely on 
the basis of the Peircean classification: there is a level where we can speak only about 
iconic signs, on the next level also indices appear, and finally, on the third level, there are 
symbols. 
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– I agree that this classification is a very good one. But Peirce wrote several volumes, 
while this classification occupies only half a page. And what do we do with the rest? 
– But this classification is directly connected with how Peirce understood the sign process 
itself: it is also based on three stages. 
– But are you interested first of all in his understanding or in your science? Are you 
interested in Peirce or in the truth? 
– In any case, in any understanding, we deal with models. We construct models in order 
to understand language, culture and communication… We use models all the time. 
– Yes, of course. 
– As to these models, we take them from somewhere. For instance, there are Saussurean, 
Fregean, Peircean models of signs… 
– But one can also create a model oneself, a model in which the approaches of Peirce 
and Saussure are combined. That’s what I do. As to the ternary model, it can be found 
also in other works than Peirce’s. 
– Anyhow, your model is not a Saussurean model, even if in your definition of the 
linguistic sign you follow Saussure.
– Yes, that’s right. But the times of Saussure were already so long ago! 
– Therefore, in some of your works you find it more appropriate to base yourself on Peirce 
and in some other works, on Saussure… When do you go from Peirce to Saussure, and 
vice versa? 
– I don’t know… But I wouldn’t say that it depends on my particular works, in one 
and the same work I can be guided by both of them (as, for instance, in the book Ego 
loquens). 
– Speaking about the Tartu–Moscow School in general, in the initial period of its existence 
its participants wrote a lot about binary oppositions, which, in general, corresponded well 
with the Saussurean approach. However, later, in the 1980s, their intellectual evolution 
from binarity towards ternarity becomes evident. We can see this both in Lotman’s works 
and in your own... And it is precisely this evolution, this deviation from Saussure which 
seems interesting. 
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– Yes, all this is true. But we have never sworn allegiance to Saussure! Yes, at some 
point in my life, I read him and I liked him. So what? I have also read Jakobson and I 
liked him too. Sometimes I deviate from Jakobson, sometimes I follow him…
– Yes, but when diverging from Saussure, rather than going towards Peirce it was also 
possible to direct your intellectual steps, for instance, towards Greimas, towards a 
quaternary model. 
– To tell you the truth, I don’t know much about those matters and, in general, the 
models of signs are of little interest for me. I am interested first of all in applied aspects 
of semiotics, for instance, when I see, let us say, some historical problems which must 
be explained, I try to explain them. And if, for this explanation, Peirce has something 
to offer… But, no, I cannot even say that “Peirce has something to offer”, because I read 
Peirce very long ago, it was still in my youth... But anyhow, I choose a model, let us say, 
a sign model which seems appropriate in order to explain one situation or another. 
And doing so, I never think whether it corresponds to Peirce or not. Yes, I have read 
Peirce, I have read Saussure and Frege, too… And afterwards, I digested them, and my 
works are a result of this digestion. 
– We wonder when, in general, Peirce’s ideas arrived in Russia. It is well known when 
Saussurean theories came there, but as to Peirce… 
– I have known Peirce’s works since my student years, but I probably read him in the 
original, not in translation. 
– On the other hand, you discovered Saussure also when you were student – therefore you 
got to know their theories approximately at the same time, though Saussure had already 
been translated into Russian by that time and therefore they knew him better in Russia.
– Yes, of course. 
– Did the participants of Moscow–Tartu School know Peirce well?
– They knew Peirce, of course, but only as far as it is possible to know him in general. 
And, in my opinion, it is impossible to know him, because he is very confusing. But, 
at least, I knew the classification which you were speaking about. 
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9.
– In your book you say that one of the major functions of deixis (in particular, of personal 
pronouns) is to form a foundation to getting to know the objective reality (p. 41, etc.). 
And if we imagine a language in which there are no personal pronouns at all, what kind 
of thought will people speaking this language have? 
– It is a difficult question. It seems to me that, theoretically, no languages can exist 
without personal pronouns. And at the same time it seems that sometimes one can 
observe something of this kind. If we take Japanese, for instance, there were and there 
are personal pronouns as such in this language, but they are so disguised by the forms 
of politeness that they seem to be already something else, not pure pronouns. Anyhow, 
they are not simple pronouns. I think that the situation is the same in some other 
oriental languages, for instance, in the Korean or in the Thai language. We can suppose 
that some people (maybe peasants) can use personal pronouns there on which the 
forms of politeness are less superposed. I am inclined to think that in such languages 
personal pronouns are present, so to say, on the onthological level – they are what is 
substituted by forms of politeness. 
– Therefore, if we go back to your classification of signs, the distribution of signs in these 
languages, once again, will not coincide with the distribution of linguistic forms, let us 
say, in Russian?
– No, in the case if there are no personal pronouns in these languages (but I am not 
sure of it).
– Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a human language without personal pronouns – nor 
a language of animals with them. The fact is that personal pronouns need the presence 
of symbols which are absent in the system of animal communication: apparently if there 
are no symbols in the system of communication, deixis is simply impossible. That is, a 
monkey cannot say “I”. 
– No, I think it cannot. 
– Ноwever it is interesting that, on the one hand, human language is precisely a language 
in which it is possible to say “I”. On the other hand, the cultural evolution seems to lead 
to… no, of course, it does not lead to the language of monkeys, it is something completely 
different… 
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– Yes, all this interested me very much, too. Something very interesting is, for instance, 
replacing the address in the second person by the address in the third person; like in 
German, for instance, they now say Sie, where they once said er. Is it like this in many 
languages – for example, in Japanese, too. 
– There is, in fact, a renunciation of deixis… 
– Practically speaking, yes. 
10. 
– In view of the problem of deixis, you also discuss proper nouns in your book (pp. 14–16, 
etc.). Among other things, according to you, “the difference between pronominal and 
non-pronominal deictic words corresponds to the difference between proper and common 
nouns” (p. 17); there also exist cases of assimilation of pronouns to proper nouns (p. 28). 
But may we ask you to provide an exact definition of what a proper noun is? 
– Jakobson’s definition suits me entirely. 
– But is it possible, in your opinion, to consider this definition as universal – or, on the 
contrary, does it vary depending on the “type of thought” of a person or another? – if, for 
instance, you say that for a “mythological thought” the pronoun ‘I’ has the function of a 
proper noun (p. 61), while in English ‘I’ (associated with a proper noun) is capitalized 
(p. 82)? 
– I think that it isn’t the definition itself that varies, but its content – like the content 
of various categories of my classification, you are absolutely right. 
11.
– In your book you write about a “particular sensitivity” [оsobaya chuvstvitel’nost’] of 
the Russian language with regard to deixis. Do you think that, in this respect, the Russian 
language is special, in comparison with other Slavic languages? 
– I don’t know Slavic languages well enough to answer you for sure. Besides, it is 
also difficult to answer because the Russian language, unlike other Slavic languages, 
has less contacts – I mean, direct contacts – with other Western languages. That is 
why the Russian language can seem more conservative in this respect. But in general, 
of course, everything is changing. For instance, in my book, there is the following 
example: “I am so glad to see you!” – “So am I.” And now even I myself would already 
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agree that it is possible to say, in answer to somebody’s “Ya ochen’ rad Vas videt’!” – 
“I ya tozhe” (earlier, it was absolutely impossible to say this!). Or another example 
which I give in this book: “Eat me”. I have recently been to St. Petersburg and I 
saw there the following advertisement for some chocolate: “Poprobujte menya, ya 
sladkij” ‘Taste me, I am sweet’ (once again, in the past it was impossible to find such 
a signboard). As we can see, the Russian language is changing – undoubtedly, under 
the influence of West European languages.
–  In your book, you give a similar example of an advertisement from an Italian 
marketplace. 
– Yes. But some time later, I also found a similar example in Russia, though it is an 
evident borrowing… That is why what is written in my book bears direct relation to 
the time when I was writing it. 
12. 
– Your book Ego loquens which covers, as you say, the problems of language communi-
cation and which touches upon the questions of language phenomenology (p. 7), is divided 
into three large parts dealing, respectively, with (I) “Deixis and communication” and with 
(II, III) “Communication and understanding” (“How understanding is related to speech 
production” and “Understanding and linguistic experiments”). If you were asked to write 
a little conclusion to the whole book, one which would cover the conclusions to the three 
parts of your book at once, what would you write?
– I would formulate what this book is about in the following way: “In this book, I tried 
to explain how we understand text”. 
13.
– In your opinion, what united all the participants of the Moscow–Tartu School? What 
did they have in common? 
– I don’t know …
– But did they have anything in common?
– Of course, they did… First of all, it was our unrestrictedness as to one particular 
profession, our interest in other domains, our intellectual openness. Secondly, our 
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conviction that it was possible, to a certain – even if to a minimal – degree to come 
nearer to truth, as well as our certitude that truth is not mathematical. Besides, of 
course, we were united by our confidence in one another – I mean, first of all, our 
human confidence. And also, maybe, it was our interior “oppositional qualities” 
[oppozitsionnost’] which could not be reduced to being in the opposition, to being 
against somebody or something: we were against the regime problems in general. 
– Would it also be possible to say that you were united by some common topics or 
notions? Were you united by the notion of semiotics, by the notion of culture? 
– Yes, the notion of semiotics united us all, indeed. The notion of culture too – but that 
was afterwards, at the second stage. 
– Thank you very much, Boris Andreevich! 
– Thank you. 
(Translated from Russian by Ekaterina Velmezova)
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Борис Успенский об истории, лингвистике и семиотике
Высказывая свое мнение об истории и современном состоянии лингвистики и 
семиотики, в двух интервью Борис Успенский рассуждает о необходимости разработки 
общей рабочей терминологии для специалистов по семиотике, в то же время говоря 
о перспективах междисциплинарных исследований, о существовании разных исследо-
вательских моделей и о принципиальных возможностях доказательств теорий в гумани-
тарных науках. Возвращаясь к уже написанным своим работам – в частности, к книге Ego 
loquens (2007), – Борис Успенский комментирует ряд важных событий своей акаде ми-
ческой биографии и делится воспоминаниями о встречах и контактах с коллегами, 
особенно подчеркивая значимость дружбы с Романом Якобсоном и Юрием Лотманом. 
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Boriss Uspenski ajaloost, keeleteadusest ja semiootikast
Läbi kahe intervjuu esitab Boriss Uspenski oma vaateid semiootika ja lingvistika ajaloole ja 
praegusele seisule. Ta rõhutab vajadust ühtse semiootikaterminoloogia järele ning kõneleb 
interdistsiplinaarsete uuringute perspektiividest, erinevatest mudelitest ja tõestamisvõimalustest 
humanitaarteadustes. Kommenteerides oma töid, põhjalikumalt eelkõige raamatut Ego loquens 
(2007), kirjeldab ta ühtlasi olulisi sündmusi oma teadlaselus ning räägib kontaktidest Louis 
Hjelmslev’, Roman Jakobsoni ja Juri Lotmaniga.
